A Four-Step Blueprint for Fixing Manchester United

A decade ago, a new star signing at Manchester United offered a rallying cry amidst a difficult season. "We have to be together. Now is not the time to blame anyone," he urged. "Now is the time to stick together—with the manager, with his staff, the players and with the people on the board... We need to believe in him, because as players we know we have to improve."

These words, spoken in April 2014, didn't come from a recent acquisition like Matheus Cunha or Benjamin Sesko. They weren't from Cristiano Ronaldo, Bruno Fernandes, or any of the high-profile names that have passed through Old Trafford in the years since. The speaker was Juan Mata, who had just joined from Chelsea that January.

Mata, who had been sidelined at his former club, remained optimistic about his new home. "Everyone I spoke with in football said, 'Yeah, maybe Manchester United aren't at their best this season—but it's still Manchester United!'" he recalled. "This will always be a top-level club... if you don't play Champions League one season, you'll play in it the next year, or you will still win trophies, because it's what the club is about."

Just weeks after Mata's vote of confidence, manager David Moyes was dismissed before completing his first season, the first in the post-Sir Alex Ferguson era. More than ten years later, Mata's quotes could be attributed to almost any player who has worn the United shirt since. The pattern has become painfully familiar: the manager is blamed for poor results, a player defends him, the club's illustrious history is invoked as a promise of a better future, and ultimately, that same history is used as the benchmark to justify the manager's inevitable sacking.

This cycle has repeated itself with relentless consistency. It happened to Moyes, then Louis van Gaal, José Mourinho, Ole Gunnar Solskjær, and Erik ten Hag. History suggests it is only a matter of time before the next manager, whoever that may be, suffers the same fate.

The on-pitch results almost feel like a distraction from the larger, systemic issue. United have been trapped in a downward spiral for a decade. Even with respectable underlying statistics this season—the fourth-best expected goal differential in the league—it's hard to buy into any signs of progress. Unless a fundamental change occurs, the narrative will remain the same.

A significant part of the problem is that, for some, there has been little incentive for change. Under the Glazer family's ownership, the club has experienced a dramatic decline in on-field success while its financial valuation has soared into the billions.

But what if the key decision-makers at United genuinely wanted to build a team capable of competing with the likes of Liverpool, Arsenal, and Manchester City? The solution might be simpler than it seems: learn from their rivals.

Step One: Emulate Liverpool's Decision-Making

When Fenway Sports Group (FSG) acquired Liverpool, the club was in a period of mediocrity, finishing seventh in the league. In the following years, they recorded sixth, eighth, and seventh-place finishes. A surprise title challenge in 2013-14 offered a glimmer of hope, but it was followed by a return to sixth and eighth place.

This spell of inconsistency, punctuated by false dawns, mirrors Manchester United's current predicament. Since then, however, Liverpool's trajectory has been one of sustained success. In the last nine seasons, they have finished outside the top four only once, won the Premier League, lifted the Champions League trophy, and reached two other European finals. They have reached a point where sitting second in the table, one point off the top, is considered a potential "crisis."

So, how did Liverpool achieve this transformation? In the 2010-11 season, their revenue ranked ninth globally, far exceeding their league position. While impressive, this financial standing was comparable to Germany's Schalke and would have only made them the third-richest club in Italy or Spain at the time. Their success was not built on financial dominance alone, but on smarter, more strategic decisions.

A decade ago, Liverpool found themselves financially outmatched by European giants like Real Madrid and Barcelona, whose revenues were double their own. Even within the Premier League, Manchester United, Chelsea, and Arsenal operated in a different financial stratosphere.

To bridge this gap, Liverpool embraced a strategy that had already revolutionized American sports: a deep, structural commitment to data analytics. It wasn't merely about using data; it was about creating a decision-making framework where analytics had a genuine impact on the club's direction.

Ian Graham, Liverpool's former head of research, highlighted the importance of this top-down approach. "We had owners that were deeply invested in a data-driven approach, which isn't the case at other teams," he explained. "You need that investment from the top, otherwise it's just not going to work."

Graham also noted the crucial role of a like-minded sporting director. "I also had the privilege of working for a sporting director who is also heavily invested in data," he added. "So even if the owners are invested, that doesn't mean that people actually making the sporting decisions are invested."

After an initial misstep with Damien Comolli, Fenway Sports Group (FSG) appointed Michael Edwards as sporting director. Having previously worked with Graham at Tottenham, Edwards, a former scout, understood the power of data to counteract biases, reveal hidden insights, and streamline operations. He trusted Graham's team to provide actionable intelligence that would lead to on-pitch success.

This created a collaborative powerhouse. Key decisions on player signings involved Edwards, then-manager Jurgen Klopp, and FSG's representative Mike Gordon. According to Edwards, the most successful transfers were those that received unanimous approval from the scouting, coaching, and financial departments.

This robust process allowed Liverpool to unearth undervalued talent. While they couldn't compete for the world's most expensive players, they could outbid rivals for hidden gems identified by their system. This is how they secured Roberto Firmino, Sadio Mané, and Mohamed Salah in successive summers, laying the foundation for future triumphs before a single major trophy was won.

United's Decade of Disarray

In stark contrast, Manchester United has lacked a comparable decision-making structure. Under Sir Alex Ferguson, the manager was the entire structure. Following his departure in 2013, the Glazers failed to build a modern front office, creating a power vacuum that has been filled haphazardly by different individuals year after year.

While other top clubs evolved, shifting power away from a single manager and adopting smarter investment strategies for multi-million-dollar player acquisitions, United stagnated. This fundamental difference in approach is the primary reason for their struggles over the past decade, despite continued high spending.

A Blueprint for the Future

A successful model can be seen in other sports, such as the Los Angeles Dodgers in baseball. The Dodgers combine the league's highest payroll with elite front-office leadership under Andrew Friedman, who previously built the small-market Tampa Bay Rays into contenders using innovative, data-driven methods. The result is a dynasty built on smarts and spending, with 13 consecutive playoff appearances.

For Manchester United's new leadership, Sir Jim Ratcliffe and INEOS, appointing their own "Andrew Friedman" should be the top priority. While managers and players come and go, a strong sporting director ensures long-term cohesion and strategic vision beyond a one or two-year cycle.

However, early signs are concerning. After poaching Dan Ashworth from Newcastle for the role, he departed amid reported disagreements over a managerial hire. The position was then temporarily filled by Sir Dave Brailsford and subsequently by Jason Wilcox. This instability points to a flawed process. When a club's head of football operations leaves over a coaching appointment, the entire decision-making structure is fundamentally broken.

The Arsenal Model: Building from Within

Another crucial lesson comes from Arsenal. A key reason for their recent ascent to the top of the Premier League, even more so than manager Mikel Arteta, has been their world-class academy.

Arsenal's resurgence as a Premier League powerhouse isn't just about smart tactics; it's rooted in a deep-seated commitment to young talent, a strategy that manifests in two crucial ways.

The Academy Advantage

First and foremost, the club's Hale End academy is experiencing a golden era. Bukayo Saka has blossomed into one of the world's elite players, with his market value, according to Transfermarkt, surpassed only by a handful of global superstars like Kylian Mbappé and Jude Bellingham. The most remarkable part? Arsenal acquired him for nothing.

This model of developing homegrown talent provides immense financial and competitive benefits. A study by consultancy Twenty First Group calculated that Liverpool saved an estimated £150 million over nine seasons by nurturing Trent Alexander-Arnold, factoring in the transfer fees and wages they would have spent to buy a player of his caliber.

Saka offers Arsenal similar, if not greater, value. The production line shows no signs of slowing down, with teenagers like Myles Lewis-Skelly, Ethan Nwaneri, and Max Dowman already on the cusp of the first team. It's a team-building cheat code that could see nearly half of Arsenal's starting lineup composed of academy graduates in the near future.

This approach has been a cornerstone for other top clubs as well. The emergence of Alexander-Arnold at Liverpool and Phil Foden at Manchester City were pivotal in their respective rises. Even Chelsea's 2021 Champions League-winning side featured academy products Mason Mount and Reece James in the final.

In stark contrast, Manchester United's recent academy record has been less fruitful. Their most promising talents, such as Alejandro Garnacho and Marcus Rashford, have either moved on or seen their development stall. While player progression is unpredictable, a consistent, well-funded academy strategy is a numbers game that eventually pays dividends. Given Arsenal's success in the competitive London football scene, there's little reason Manchester United can't replicate it.

A Youth-Centric Transfer Policy

Beyond its academy, Arsenal has strategically focused its recruitment on young, high-potential players. For years, the club almost exclusively signed players before or just as they were entering their prime years. This philosophy is evident in the age at which their core players were acquired:

William Saliba: 18 Gabriel Martinelli: 18 Jakub Kiwior: 21 Gabriel Magalhães: 22 Martin Ødegaard: 22 Jurriën Timber: 22 Ben White: 23 Declan Rice: 24 Kai Havertz: 24

This pattern extends to key contributors. Among players with at least 10 league starts last season, only Mikel Merino, Leandro Trossard, and Thomas Partey were signed in their prime. Trossard was a mid-season addition to bolster a title charge, while Partey was a holdover from a previous, less successful transfer era.

Arsenal's method was clear: build a foundation by betting on young talent, ensure those bets pay off, and watch the players mature together. Only after re-establishing themselves as title contenders did they begin to add experienced, older players to the mix.

Manchester United's recent strategy appears far more reactive. They signed a 30-year-old Casemiro to a massive contract after a mediocre season and brought in players like Bryan Mbeumo (25) and Matheus Cunha (26) following a 15th-place finish. Meanwhile, expensive younger signings like Rasmus Højlund and Antony have been sent out on loan, and others have failed to make an impact, raising questions about the club's long-term vision and ability to elevate its ceiling.

Manchester United's struggles with player recruitment can be traced back to a fundamental flaw: the club lacks a unified process for identifying talent and quantifying a player's value. This, combined with the inherent randomness of player development, has led to inconsistent results in the transfer market. However, a robust decision-making process would provide stability, preventing panic after a few failed signings. After all, even the most successful clubs only succeed on slightly more than half of their acquisitions.

But a significant portion of these failures stems from the club's approach to its managers and the immense influence they wield.

Learning from Manchester City's Flexibility

A look back at United's recent history reveals a clear, problematic pattern. David Moyes brought Marouane Fellaini from Everton. Louis van Gaal signed Bastian Schweinsteiger from Bayern Munich. Jose Mourinho reunited with Nemanja Matic from Chelsea. Ole Gunnar Solskjaer brought back his former teammate, Cristiano Ronaldo. Most recently, Erik ten Hag signed four of his former Ajax players, another he coached at FC Twente, and several other Dutch talents.

This trend has continued under the club's hypothetical next manager, "Ruben Amorim." While his signings might not be as narrowly focused as Ten Hag's, they are still "Amorim signings"—players specifically chosen to fit his rigid three-at-the-back system, which utilizes inside forwards instead of traditional wingers.

The problem is self-evident. None of these managers have lasted three full seasons, yet the players they sign are on contracts that extend well beyond that. The result is a disjointed, "Frankenstein's monster" of a squad, composed of remnants from the tactical philosophies of every departed coach. By building a team for the specifics of the current manager, Manchester United ultimately builds a team for no one.

The Guardiola Model of Pragmatism

To break this cycle, United must abandon the search for an all-powerful, transformative coach. It may seem counterintuitive to point to Manchester City as an example, given Pep Guardiola's iconic status, but the key is to emulate his flexibility, not his identity.

In his first title-winning season at City, Guardiola ingeniously converted midfielder Fabian Delph into a functional left-back. Delph had a brief, shining moment in that 2017-18 campaign, a testament to Guardiola's ability to find solutions with the players at his disposal.

The following season, he adapted his system to accommodate Sergio Aguero. While Aguero is a legendary goalscorer, he wasn't the mobile, "false-nine" type Guardiola had previously favored. Yet, Guardiola adjusted, even after losing Kevin De Bruyne for most of the season. He did it by adopting a more traditional English style, playing left-footed Leroy Sane on the left wing and right-footed Raheem Sterling on the right. The team was arguably even better.

After Aguero's departure, Guardiola won another title without a recognized striker, leading the league with 99 goals in 2021-22. The scoring was spread out, with seven different players netting at least eight goals.

Then came Erling Haaland, a player unlike any Guardiola had ever managed—a pure finisher who is minimally involved in build-up play. Guardiola adapted once more, and City won two more league titles. This season, his team is playing more directly and conservatively than ever before.

United shouldn't be looking for the "next Pep" to stay for a decade. Instead, they need a coach defined by pragmatism—not in the defensive sense, but as a problem-solver. They need a manager who, unlike the rigid "Amorim," can assess the available talent and devise the most effective way to organize it.

A source with experience in data-driven front offices across multiple sports, including European football, confirmed this approach, stating that the primary qualities he looks for in a coach are "flexibility and problem solving."

Hiring a tactically flexible coach offers a significant advantage: it dramatically expands the pool of potential signings. This approach prevents a club from assembling a disjointed roster like Manchester United's, which has been partially built to suit the conflicting visions of three different managers. With a versatile coach, a club can identify the best available talent, sign them, and trust the manager to integrate them effectively.

Of course, a general philosophy must still be agreed upon. A team with United's ambitions cannot adopt the defensive posture of Sean Dyche's Burnley or even the style of Scott Parker's current squad. The primary objective remains to dominate critical areas of the pitch, particularly in front of both goals.

However, "attacking football" is not a monolithic concept. Jurgen Klopp's Liverpool and Pep Guardiola's Manchester City both prioritized attack but did so in vastly different ways. Similarly, the high-intensity style of Hansi Flick's Barcelona would likely give Mikel Arteta fits, while Flick might find Arsenal's methodical play a cure for insomnia. Despite their contrasting methods, both teams successfully control possession and consistently win matches.

The Ownership Question: Sell or Reform?

The solution for Manchester United seems simple on paper. The club possesses such immense financial power compared to nearly every other team in the world that it doesn't need to excel in every area. Merely being average at decision-making, understanding player development cycles, and identifying coaching talent would be enough to put them in contention for titles year after year.

However, "simple" and "easy" are not the same. It's clear that a deep-seated cultural and organizational decay has taken hold at the club. The decision-making structure is convoluted, and the club's financial success has removed any sense of urgency for fundamental change. The towering legacy of the Sir Alex Ferguson era now casts a long, unproductive shadow over Old Trafford, while a significant portion of the British football media consists of former United players offering questionable analysis.

Ultimately, the responsibility lies with the ownership. Aside from the supporters, the owners are the only constant figures at a football club. The Glazers have been phenomenal owners of Manchester United as a business but have failed the football club itself. While their new arrangement with Sir Jim Ratcliffe, who now runs football operations, is a step away from their hands-off approach, its effectiveness remains to be seen.

If Ratcliffe truly has full control, he has the power to implement the necessary changes. As a billionaire, he answers to no one. He can streamline the decision-making process, invest in modern, objective player identification methods, and commit to a long-term vision aimed at winning a title in five years rather than next season. This would mean moving away from the search for a single managerial savior.

Alternatively, United can continue on its current path: drifting aimlessly with no coherent strategy connecting its decisions. This will inevitably lead to another managerial change when the flawed process fails to produce results, resetting the cycle once again.

But is perpetuating this cycle really worth a $1.65 billion investment for Ratcliffe, even as a lifelong fan? Surely, there must be another billionaire out there willing to acquire the club, empower the right people, and finally overhaul the way Manchester United operates.